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1 
UNLEASHING A GATEKEEPER: WHY THE SEC 
SHOULD MANDATE DISCLOSURE OF DETAILS 
CONCERNING DIRECTORS’ & OFFICERS’ LIABILITY 
INSURANCE POLICIES 
Sean J. Griffith* 
ABSTRACT 
This Essay explores the connection between corporate 
governance and D&O insurance.  It argues that D&O 
insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate 
governance, screening and pricing corporate governance 
risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools.  As a 
result, D&O insurance premiums provide the insurer’s 
assessment of a firm’s governance quality.  Most basically, 
firms with relatively worse corporate governance pay higher 
D&O premiums.  This simple relationship could signal 
important information to investors and other capital market 
participants.  Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent.  
Corporations lack the incentive to produce this disclosure 
themselves, and U.S. securities regulators do not require 
registrants to provide this information.  This Essay therefore 
advocates a change to U.S. securities regulation, making 
disclosure of D&O policy details—specifically premiums, 
limits and retentions under each type of insurance, as well as 
the identity of the insurer—mandatory. 
 
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School (2004-2005); 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.  B.A., Sarah 
Lawrence College; J.D., Harvard Law School.  For their comments and suggestions, 
thanks to Tom Baker, Bernie Black, Martin Boyer, Jean Braucher, Tim Burns, Chris 
Cavallero, John Core, Sean Fitzpatrick, Jack Flug, Joe Monteleone, Joshua Ronen, 
Ed Rock, and David Skeel.  For excellent research assistance, thanks to Bill Draper, 
Valerie Figueredo, and Ron Day.  The viewpoints and any errors expressed herein 
are mine alone. 
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I. GATEKEEPING 
Much of the blame passed around after the recent spate of 
corporate governance scandals has fallen ultimately on the 
gatekeepers.  Soon after the fall of Enron and WorldCom, Professor 
Coffee wrote that “Enron is more about gatekeeper failure than board 
failure.”1  Moreover, although gatekeepers can include a variety of 
third-party intermediaries—including outside auditing firms, debt 
rating agencies, equity analysts, investment bankers, and lawyers2—
most of the post-Enron attention has been focused on the role of the 
outside auditor.3  In his prescription for fixing the gatekeeping crisis, 
Professor Coffee ultimately joined others in advocating a regime of 
strict liability for outside auditors, essentially converting the auditor 
into an insurer of the company’s financial statements.4 
 
1 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron:  "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid", 
57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1419 (2002). 
2 Professor Coffee defines gatekeepers as “reputational intermediaries who provide 
verification and certification services to investors.”  Id. at 1405.  See also Reinier H. 
Kraakman, Gatekeepers:  The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. 
L. ECON. & ORG. 57, 57 (1986) (defining gatekeepers as “private parties who are 
able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”). 
3 Most, not all.  See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 
116 Stat. 745, 7245 (2002) (adopting standards to increase the gatekeeping role of 
outside counsel); Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly, 35 CONN. L. REV. 
1145 (describing failure of debt ratings agencies to act as gatekeepers); Susan P. 
Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195 (2003) 
(arguing that a “lion-sized portion of blame” for Enron and other corporate 
governance crises rests with lawyers). 
4 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure And Reform: The Challenge Of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U.L. REV. 301 (2004) (suggesting a form of 
strict liability for auditors that would limit their exposure to a multiple of the highest 
annual revenues the gatekeepers had recently received from the defrauding client).  
Professor Coffee’s ultimate proposal is similar to a proposal previously made by 
Professor Partnoy.  See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians At The Gatekeepers?:  A 
Proposal For A Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 491 (2001); 
Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability For Gatekeepers: A Reply To Professor Coffee, 84 
B.U.L. REV. 365 (2004).  Comparing his proposal to Professor Coffee’s, Professor 
Partnoy has written: 
The key to our proposals is the creation of a reinsurance market for securities 
fraud risks, where gatekeepers would behave more like insurers.  There are a 
variety of ways to do this.  Professor Coffee favors the use of caps based on a 
multiple of the gatekeeper's revenues; I prefer limiting gatekeeper liability 
through contracting based on a percentage of the issuer's liability. 
Partnoy, 84 B.U.L. REV. at 375.  Rather than converting the auditor into an insurer, 
others have instead advanced a more direct insurance-market solution—Financial 
Statement Insurance—and argued that companies ought to be able to choose 
between financial statement auditing and financial statement insurance.  See 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement 
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Yet for all of the focus on the gatekeeping role of the outside 
auditor, another potential gatekeeper has escaped notice.  This is the 
directors’ and officers’ (“D&O”) liability insurer.  Although their 
primary role is to spread the risk of loss from shareholder litigation, 
not necessarily to provide the verification and certification services 
expected of third-party gatekeepers, the D&O insurer has all the right 
incentives to act as a corporate governance gatekeeper.  Because a 
firm’s risk of shareholder litigation corresponds to the firm’s 
corporate governance, D&O insurers have every reason to become 
experts at assessing corporate governance in order to evaluate and 
ultimately charge for the risks they assume.5  The D&O insurer thus 
serves as an accidental gatekeeper, guarding the entrance of its risk 
pool by evaluating the governance quality of prospective insureds and 
charging an appropriate premium to firms it agrees to insure. 
The D&O insurer’s incentive to serve as a corporate governance 
gatekeeper produces a simple but powerful hypothesis concerning the 
relationship of D&O insurance to corporate governance: firms with 
worse corporate governance pay higher D&O premiums than firms 
with better corporate governance.  A firm’s D&O coverage should 
thus convey an important signal about the firm.  Specifically, by 
examining the firm’s premium, limits and retentions under each type 
of coverage, as well as the identity of the primary insurer, investors 
and other capital market participants should be able to learn the 
insurer’s assessment of the quality of the firm’s corporate 
governance.6 
This Essay develops the governance-insurance hypothesis and 
explores its implications and limitations.  After this Introduction, Part 
II evaluates the link between corporate governance and shareholder 
litigation, arguing that even if shareholder litigation does not 
necessarily lead to better corporate governance, better corporate 
governance ought to lead to less shareholder litigation, which 
provides D&O insurers with an adequate reason to concern 
 
Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413 (2005); Joshua 
Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-visited, 8 
STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 39 (2002). 
5 Such expertise would be a product of competition against other D&O insurers 
since those that are less able to predict the nature of the risks they underwrite face 
adverse selection in their risk pools and, ultimately, claims costs significantly higher 
than their more skilled competitors.  George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": 
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) 
(providing the classic account of adverse selection from the example of a used car 
market). 
6 A policy’s “limit” is the total amount of coverage—that is, the maximum amount 
the insurer could be made to pay.  The “retention,” also referred to as the 
“deductible” is the portion of the claim that the insured must pay even if the 
policy’s limits are not exhausted. 
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themselves with corporate governance.  Part III reviews the role and 
function of D&O insurance in corporations, describing how D&O 
insurance works and why corporations buy D&O insurance.  Part IV 
then examines the relationship between corporate governance and 
D&O insurance, arguing that D&O insurers should and in fact do take 
corporate governance into account when writing (and pricing) D&O 
policies.  As a result, Part IV concludes that a firm’s D&O coverage 
should convey an important signal to investors and other capital 
market participants.  Unfortunately, as discussed in Part V, this signal 
is not reaching the market.  Corporations typically do not disclose the 
details of their D&O policies and, in the United States unlike other 
countries, no court or regulator makes them. 
They should.  Because basic D&O policy details could signal 
important information to investors and thereby improve the efficiency 
of the capital markets, this Essay argues that U.S. securities 
regulations should be changed to require the disclosure of this 
information.  The SEC has sufficient authority to make this change 
which, as described in Part V, would be technically simple and 
unlikely to incur principled opposition.  Moreover, the benefits of this 
change are potentially large, effectively unleashing a new gatekeeper 
in American corporate governance and triggering a flood of useful 
information into the market.  The Essay then closes, in Part VI, with a 
brief summary and conclusion. 
 
II. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The hypothesis that D&O insurers function as corporate 
governance gatekeepers, signaling firm value through the D&O 
premium depends, first, on the relationship between shareholder 
litigation and corporation governance.  As used in this Essay, 
“shareholder litigation” refers to all claims covered under a D&O 
policy, whether brought by a regulatory agency, a holder, purchaser, 
or seller of a firm’s securities.7  The Essay gives a similarly expansive 
definition to “corporate governance,” defining it broadly to refer to 
any policies or structural mechanisms effecting management of the 
firm.8  If there were no relationship between shareholder litigation and 
 
7 See infra note 50 (defining “Claims” under a typical D&O policy). 
8 This understanding of corporate governance does not limit it to specific 
governance terms, typically found in charter or bylaw provisions, which have 
generally been found to have an ambiguous effect on firm value.  See, e.g., Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate 
Governance? Harvard Law & Economics Discussion Paper No. 491, available 
online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423 (2004); Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. 
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corporate governance, then the D&O insurer could not improve the 
quality of its risk pool by evaluating a firm’s corporate governance 
and, as a result, insurance premiums would have nothing more than a 
random, accidental relationship to corporate governance.  This Part 
argues, however, that the relationship between corporate governance 
and shareholder litigation is strong enough to support the insurer-as-
gatekeeper hypothesis. 
Shareholder litigation, notwithstanding the breadth of the 
definition I have given it, typically involves three types of claims: 
shareholder derivative actions, shareholder direct actions, and 
securities fraud claims.  Derivative suits—actions brought by 
shareholders on the corporation’s behalf to recover for a manager’s 
breach of duty—were once thought to exert an important constraint 
on managerial agency costs.9  Now, however, a wide variety of 
procedural obstacles enables boards to terminate such claims early 
and at relatively low cost.10  In addition to the derivative suit, state 
corporate law also allows shareholders to sue individually or as a 
class when they can allege an injury that is not derivative of an injury 
to the corporation.11  These claims, typically brought as class actions 
 
Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (2004); K.J.M. Cremers & 
V.B. Nair, Governance Mechanisms And Equity Prices, Yale Working Paper 
(2003); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 
Q. J. ECON. 107 (2003).  The correlation of D&O insurance pricing to specific 
governance terms is outside of the scope of this paper and is the subject of an 
empirical project that I am currently undertaking with my colleague Tom Baker. 
9 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) 
(stating that the derivative action “born of stockholder helplessness, was long the 
chief regulator of corporate management” and noting the argument that “without it 
there would be little practical check on such abuses”).  This Article will refer to the 
divergence in interests between management and shareholder interests as “agency 
costs.”  See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976) (identifying the divergence in interests between principal and 
agent as a central feature of the separation of ownership and control). 
10 These include the requirement that the plaintiffs make demand and, in some 
states, post a bond for corporate defense costs.  More broadly, procedural hurdles 
include the business judgment rule and the ability of a special litigation committee 
to wrest control of the litigation from the plaintiff.  See generally N.Y. Bus. Corp. 
Law §627 (requiring posting of a bond); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 
Supr. 1996) (discussing the demand requirement); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 
A.2d 779 (Del. Supr. 1981) (special committee); Auerbach v. Bennett, 419 N.Y.S. 
2d 920 (1979) (special committee).  These procedural obstacles reflect the widely-
held view that derivative litigation is a corporate nuisance, of value only to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, leading some to argue that the derivative action should be 
abolished.  See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 404-405 (2002). 
11 See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d at 1213 (discussing distinction between 
derivative and direct claims). 
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challenging board conduct in the context of takeovers or acquisition 
transactions, have come to dominate state corporate law filings.12  
They are not as easily terminated as derivative claims and, according 
to some commentators, target precisely those transactions in which 
agency costs are potentially highest.13  Finally, securities litigation 
may be brought in many of the same situations that give rise to state 
corporate law claims.14  Although these claims must be framed around 
misrepresentations or inadequacies in corporate disclosure,15 the basic 
concern—that company managers have misused their positions to the 
disadvantage of their shareholders—is the same whether the 
complaint is framed under corporate or securities law.16  The biggest 
difference, it seems, is the potential for damages, with securities 
litigation presenting by far the greatest liability threat to corporations 
and their managers.17 
 
12 See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder 
Litigation: Acquistion-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 137 (2004) 
(finding that approximately 80% of all fiduciary duty claims filed in Delaware 
Chancery Court in 1999 and 2000 were class actions challenging board conduct in 
an acquisition and that only 14% of fiduciary duty claims over the same period were 
derivative suits). 
13 See id., at 139 (arguing that “shareholder acquisition litigation polices those 
management transactions with the highest potential for self-dealing”).  Agency costs 
may be high in both hostile and friendly acquisitions.  See generally Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
975, 977-81 (arguing that boards should not be permitted to block hostile takeover 
offers); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protections in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1899, 1946 (2003) (arguing that the management team’s last period presents 
agency costs and therefore the possibility of diversions from shareholder welfare 
even in the context of negotiated acquisitions).  But see Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence 
J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder 
Class Actions, __ VAND. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2004) (finding that indications 
of litigation agency costs are also present in acquisition-oriented class actions). 
14 See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate 
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 861 (2003) 
(arguing that outside of the context of self-dealing and acquisitions “corporate 
governance … has passed to federal law and in particular to shareholder litigation 
under Rule 10b-5”). 
15 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988) (allowing a 10b-5 claim 
to survive dismissal on the basis of an allegation that shareholders sold at a price 
reflecting the company’s false or misleading statements, thereby replacing 
traditional notions of fraud with the “fraud-on-the-market” theory). 
16 Thompson & Sale, supra note 14, at 903 (citing the concern “that management 
has misused its position with respect to corporate assets”). 
17 See, e.g., Elaine Buckberg, et. al., Recent Trends in Class Action Litigation: Bear 
Market Cases Bring Big Settlements (NERA Economic Consulting 2005) (reporting 
that the mean securities settlement increased by 33% in 2004 to $27.1 million and 
stating that, although the median settlement fell slightly from $5.5 million to $5.3 
million, the “increase in mean settlements cannot be explained by a handful of 
extraordinary settlements”); Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Post-Reform Act 
   UNLEASHING A GATEKEEPER 7 
 
A long list of actions may give rise to one or more of these forms 
of shareholder litigation.  Knepper and Bailey, for example, provide a 
170 item checklist of potential bases for liability with category 
headings including “Governance, Management, and Business,” 
“Informed Business Judgment,” “Unauthorized or Ultra Vires 
Actions,” “Self-Dealing and Conflicts of Interest,” “Change of 
Control Situations,” and “Disclosures.”18  The common theme 
underlying all of these liability threats, however, is a corporate 
structure that enables managers to act contrary to the best interests of 
their shareholders.  Whether shareholders bring a derivative claim 
alleging a wealth transfer from shareholders to management, a direct 
action claiming that an entrenched board has not acted to maximize 
shareholder wealth in the context of a takeover, or a securities claim 
alleging that managers misstated earnings in order to protect their 
incentive compensation packages, the underlying cause is the failure 
of the corporation to design a structure to constrain its managers from 
acting to benefit themselves at the expense of their shareholders.19 
Good governance ought to lead to less litigation.  Corporate 
governance constraints may prevent managers from deviating from 
shareholder interests and thus triggering shareholder claims.  
Alternately, even if it cannot prevent managerial opportunism, 
corporate governance mechanisms may enable its detection and 
eradication, thereby limiting the total loss to shareholders and, 
ultimately, the cost of litigation.20  In other words, insofar as defective 
corporate governance underlies all forms of shareholder litigation, 
better governance ought to translate into less litigation or, at least, less 
costly claims.  
The assertion that better governance leads to less litigation is not 
the same as the assertion that that litigation will lead to better 
governance.  Indeed, there is considerable doubt concerning the latter 
proposition.  In an influential study of derivative litigation, for 
example, Professor Romano concluded that “shareholder litigation is 
 
Securities Lawsuits: Settlements Reported Through December 2003, at 4 
(Cornerstone Research 2004) (reporting that average securities claims costs have 
tripled since 1997).  The higher recoveries in securities litigation may reflect the 
fact that there are fewer procedural hurdles in the way of securities plaintiffs in 
comparison to corporate law plaintiffs.  See supra note 10. 
18 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS 
AND DIRECTORS, 7th ed., at §17.02. 
19 The same harm may thus give rise to a claim under corporate law, whether 
derivative or direct, and securities law.  See Thompson & Sale, supra note 14 
(noting this overlap). 
20 See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47-48 
(1996) (discussing costs of opportunism). 
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a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of corporate governance.”21  
Relatedly, in a famous study of securities class action settlements, 
Professor Alexander concluded that the merits do not matter in the 
settlement of securities claims.22  The core concern driving both 
analyses can be characterized as “litigation agency costs”—that is, the 
divergence between the interests of the plaintiffs’ attorney controlling 
the litigation and the shareholder plaintiffs that the attorney 
supposedly represents.23  This disconnect leads plaintiffs’ lawyers 
both to file claims that shareholders would prefer not to press,24 and to 
settle claims that shareholders would prefer to pursue.25  Litigation 
agency costs thus distort the ability of shareholder litigation to check 
managerial agency costs.26 
 
21 Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991). 
22 Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements of 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991). 
23 See Alexander, supra note 22, at 500 (citing “the economic incentives of litigation 
decisionmakers” as a core cause of the failure of settlements to follow the merits of 
the claim); Romano, supra note 21, at 57 (“attorneys’ incentives are the key factor 
in shareholder litigation”).  Accord John C. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The 
Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 5 (1985). 
24 See, e.g., Elliot Weiss & John Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: 
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 
104 YALE L. J. 2053, 2060-64 (1995) (describing the plaintiffs’ lawyers practice of 
rushing to the courthouse any time a dip in stock price can be tied to a piece of bad 
news). 
25 See Romano, supra note 21, at 61 (supporting hypothesis that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
are willing to settle for attorneys’ fees but recovery to shareholders by finding that 
although only half of the settlements in her sample resulted in any recovery to 
shareholders, 90% awarded attorneys’ fees).  On the question of when, according to 
shareholders’ best interests, shareholder litigation should be pursued, see Reinier 
Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in 
Shareholder Interests, 82 GEO. L. J. 1733 (1994). 
26 See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class 
Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1996); Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, 
Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 
90 VA. L. REV. 1849 (2004); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic 
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1991); Adam J. 
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with 
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999);  See also 
authors cited at supra note 23.  The problem of litigation agency costs also shaped 
the reforms adopted in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.  See 
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. 77-78).  D&O insurance arguably exacerbates these distortions by 
effectively releasing directors and officers from the threat of personal liability.  See 
James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1, 21-37 (1997) (weighing arguments that insurance 
undercuts the deterrence effects of shareholder litigation). 
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Skepticism that shareholder litigation operates as an effective 
governance constraint should not, however, be taken as reason to 
doubt that effective corporate governance will lead to less shareholder 
litigation.27  Litigation agency costs disrupt the causal connection 
between litigation and governance, but not necessarily the link 
between governance and litigation.  The distortion of litigation agency 
costs arises only after conduct giving rise to a potential claim has 
taken place, at which point plaintiffs’ lawyers may pursue nuisance 
suits and settle valid claims so that the ultimate result bears little 
relation to the socially optimal sanction for the conduct.28  Corporate 
governance mechanisms, by contrast, operate before the harmful 
conduct has occurred.  Because corporate governance operates at a 
level prior to the introduction of litigation agency costs and may 
prevent the harm from ever taking place, corporate governance has a 
more direct impact on shareholder litigation than shareholder 
litigation does on corporate governance.29  Stated most concisely, 
better corporate governance should lead to less shareholder litigation 
regardless of whether shareholder litigation leads to better corporate 
governance. 
In order to advance the insurance-as-gatekeeper hypothesis, this 
Essay need only claim that better governance leads to less litigation, 
not that litigation leads to better governance.  Scholarship focusing on 
the problem of litigation agency costs has drawn the latter conclusion 
into doubt, but not the former.  Insurers therefore retain strong 
incentives to inquire into the strength of a firm’s corporate 
governance in underwriting its D&O policy. 
 
 
27Skepticism on this later point would tend to lead to the cynical view that 
shareholder litigation is essentially random, unable to serve either a compensatory 
or deterrence function, and therefore ought to be abolished.  See generally James D. 
Cox, Compensation, Deterrence and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit 
Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984) (noting that deterrence seems to 
dominate compensatory objectives in derivative suits); Reinier H. Kraakman, 
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L. J. 857, 
865 (1984) (noting the essential deterrence function of shareholder litigation). 
28 See generally Kraakman et al., supra note 25, at 1741 (arguing that shareholders 
would like suits to be brought only when the suit would increase share value as 
measured by deterrence benefits plus expected recoveries minus litigation expenses 
and ex ante salary and insurance adjustments). 
29 The problem may be conceptualized on a three-point timeline, placing in order: 
(1) the firm’s initial governance structure, (2) shareholder litigation, and (3) the 
firm’s later governance structure.  Because litigation agency costs arise with the 
litigation, they disrupt the causal chain between points 2 and 3, not between points 1 
and 2.  A firm’s initial governance structure should effect shareholder litigation at 
point 2 regardless of whether litigation at point 2 effects the firm’s governance 
structure at point 3. 
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III.THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF DIRECTORS’ & OFFICERS’ LIABILITY 
INSURANCE 
 Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance arose in the 1950s 
and 1960s as a species of the general liability policies that insurers 
had long marketed.30  The first D&O policies were not well adapted to 
the special context of corporate litigation, leaving gaps in coverage 
and, because they seemed to clash with public policy objectives, 
raising issues of enforceability.31  The troubling public policy 
question was whether a corporation could insure its managers against 
losses for which it could not legally indemnify them.32  Although 
commentators had argued that insurance payments should not be 
allowed in any circumstance where indemnification was illegal,33 
 
30 See Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance 
for Directors and Officers, 33 BUS. LAW. 1993 (1978) (“Although [D&O] policies 
have been marketed since the 1950s, the coverage had little attention until the mid-
1960s.”).  Accord Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance 
Against Directors’ and Officers’ Liability, 22 BUS. LAW. 92, 103 (1966) (noting that 
the author had written four years earlier that directors and officers “do not 
commonly insure themselves against the expenses of litigation arising out of their 
corporate status” but that since that time insurers had found a highly receptive 
market for D&O insurance, representing “a violent new twist” on the older problem 
of the propriety of indemnification payments). 
31 Professor Bishop quipped: 
Perusal of the Lloyd’s form and its American imitations leaves me with a distinct 
impression that the draughtsman, though possessed of broad and solid experience 
in the field of insurance law, got his corporation law from some rather sketchy 
recollections of Business Units I (or whatever they happened to call the basic 
corporation course at his law school) and a quick glance at Corpus Juris. 
22 BUS. LAW. 92, at 103. 
32 See id., at 106.  
33 See id., at 107 (arguing that “where the applicable statute flatly prohibits 
indemnification inconsistent with its terms, it seems to me plainly illegal for the 
corporation to pay for insurance against expenses, such as payments to the 
corporation to compensate it for a breach of duty to it”) and 109-110 (arguing that 
because “courts would never allow a corporation to indemnify an insider against 
amounts paid the corporation in settlement or satisfaction of judgment” of a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty, the same criteria should be applied “to the 
corporation’s payment for insurance which may operate to relieve the insider of 
such liability”).  See also Joseph W. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New 
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L. J. 
1078, 1087 (1967) (arguing that “an insurance policy paid for by the corporation 
whose effect was to free corporate managers from the fear of civil liability for 
breach of their duty to show good faith in their dealings with the corporation” would 
violated public policy); Note, Indemnification of Directors: The Problems Posed by 
Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1428 (1963) 
(arguing that “insurance in its present for should be voided as contrary to public 
policy wherever it would free the director from a burden from which he could not 
be freed by indemnification”); Note, Public Policy and Directors’ Liability 
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state legislators ultimately mooted the argument by passing statutes 
that expressly allowed corporations to purchase and maintain D&O 
insurance even against those losses that the corporation could not 
itself indemnify.34   
 D&O insurance thus operates as a contractual mechanism to 
spread the risk of shareholder litigation.35  It moves the risk from 
individual directors and officers to the corporation they manage and 
then to a third-party insurer, with the ultimate result that individual 
managers are almost never saddled with personal liability for causing 
corporate losses.36  If the shareholders sue, the corporation or its 
insurer pays.  This Part offers a close examination of this insurance 
arrangement.   
 
 
Insurance, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 716, 719 (1967) (arguing that insurance against 
breach of the duty of loyalty is contrary to public policy even if paid by the director 
himself). 
34 For example, Delaware General Corporate Law §145(g) provides: 
A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of 
any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the 
corporation… against any liability asserted against such person and incurred by 
such person in any such capacity, or arising out of such person's status as such, 
whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify such person 
against such liability under this section. 
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, 145(g) (2004).  See also JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP, JR., THE 
LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE 
§8.01 (revised edition, 1998) (“All states authorize the corporation to purchase and 
maintain insurance on behalf of directors and officers against liabilities incurred in 
such capacities, whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify 
against such liabilities.”). 
35 Although employment litigation plays a large role in D&O coverage for smaller 
companies, it does not for larger firms.  See Tillinghast 2003 Directors and Officers 
Liability Survey: Executive Summary of U.S. and Canadian Results, at 7 (2004) 
(reporting that “91% of the claims against nonprofit [companies] were brought by 
employees, while only 24% of claims against for-profit companies with greater than 
500 shareholders were brought by employees”).  Because the focus of this Article is 
on publicly traded companies, it focuses on shareholder litigation and not 
employment litigation as the primary source of litigation risk for D&O insurance. 
36 See Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director 
Liability, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 250 (2003).  
Recent settlements involving WorldCom and Enron compel the “almost” 
qualification.  See Gretchen Morgenson, Ex-Directors at WorldCom Settle Anew, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2005) (describing agreement according to which former 
WorldCom directors will personally contribute to settlement amount).  On the 
difficulties of reaching personal assets rather than insurance assets in the ordinary 
tort context, see Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money and the Moral Economy of 
Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 275, 277 (2001). 
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A. How D&O Insurance Works 
The general label “D&O insurance” is often applied to three 
distinct insurance arrangements.  First, there is coverage to protect 
individual managers from the risk of shareholder litigation.  Second, 
there is coverage to reimburse the corporation for its indemnification 
obligations.  And third, there is coverage to protect the corporation 
from the risk of shareholder litigation to which the corporate entity 
itself is a party.  The first two aspects of D&O coverage trace to the 
original Lloyd’s of London D&O form.37  The third form of coverage 
is a newer development.  A D&O insurance package may consist of 
these forms of coverage in any proportion.   
 The only form of D&O insurance that actually insures individual 
directors and officers is referred to within the industry as “Side A 
coverage.”38  Side A coverage essentially provides that the insurer 
will pay covered losses on behalf of managers when the corporation 
itself does not indemnify its managers.39  Covered losses include 
compensatory damages, settlement amounts, and legal fees incurred 
by the individual in connection with her service as a director or 
officer of the corporation.40 
 
37 The original Lloyd’s form contained two policies, “ALS(D4)” and “ALS(D5),” 
one for individual coverage and one for corporate coverage.   See Joseph Hinsey, et 
al., What Existing D&O Policies Cover, 27 BUS. LAW. 147, 150 (1972) (“In a 
documentary sense there are indeed two policies, designated … as ALS(D4) and 
ALS(D5) and bearing different policy numbers as issued.”). 
38 The types of coverage are named in reference to the insurance documents listing 
the respective rights and obligations.  Side A coverage relates to “Insuring 
Agreement A,” Side B coverage to “Insuring Agreement B,” and so on. 
39 Typical policy language provides: 
Except for Loss which the Insurer pays pursuant to Insuring Agreement B of this 
Policy, the Insurer will pay on behalf of the Directors and Officers Losses which 
the Directors and Officers shall become legally obligated to pay as a result of a 
Claim first made during the Policy Period or Discovery Period, if applicable, 
against the Directors and Officers for a Wrongful Act which takes place during 
or prior to the Policy Period.   
The Hartford, Directors, Officers and Company Liability Policy, Specimen DO 00 
R292 00 0696, § I.A. [hereinafter, Hartford Specimen Policy].  The effect of the 
carve out for losses paid pursuant to Insuring Agreement B is to prevent the 
managers from being paid twice for the same loss. 
40 Id. at §IV.J. (including compensatory damages, settlement amounts, and legal 
fees).  Other important definitions in the policy include “claims,” defined as the 
receipt of a written demand for relief, the filing of a civil proceeding, or the 
commencement of a formal administrative or regulatory proceeding.  Id., at §IV.A.  
Wrongful acts are defined by the policy to include errors, misstatements, omissions, 
and breaches of duty committed by directors and officers in their official capacities 
as well as any other claim against the directors and officers solely by reason of their 
position.  Id. at § IV.O. 
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The second form of D&O coverage, “Side B coverage,” does not 
protect individual managers at all but rather reimburses the 
corporation for indemnifying its directors and officers.41  Payments 
under Side B coverage are thus triggered when the corporation incurs 
an obligation to indemnify its managers, which most policies deem to 
be required in every case where a corporation is legally permitted to 
do so.42  Together, Side A and B coverage allocate the risk of loss 
from shareholder litigation as follows.  First, when a company is 
legally permitted to indemnify its managers for their liabilities, as it 
generally is, it must do so.43  Second, when a company does 
indemnify its managers, the insurer will reimburse the company 
 
41 Typical policy language provides: 
The Insurer will pay on behalf of the Company Losses for which the Company 
has, to the extent permitted or required by law, indemnified the Directors and 
Officers, and which the Directors and Officers have become legally obligated to 
pay as a result of a Claim … against the Directors and Officers for a Wrongful 
Act…. 
Id. at §I.B. 
42 Id. at §VI.F (providing that if a corporation is legally permitted to indemnify its 
officers and directors, its organizational documents will be deemed to require it to 
do so).  When a corporation that is legally able to indemnify its directors and 
officers refuses to do so, the insurer would remain obligated under the policy’s Side 
A coverage, but the obligation would be subject to the (higher) Side B retention as 
well as a coinsurance percentage).  Id.  This presumptive indemnification aspect of 
the D&O policy is aimed at preventing the possibility of opportunism, where a 
corporation refuses to indemnify solely to cause the payment obligation to fall on 
the insurer. 
43 Although most state corporate law codes broadly permit indemnification, many 
states, including Delaware, do not allow indemnification for settlements (or 
judgments) in derivative litigation on the theory that such awards benefit the 
company and are paid, minus the chunk awarded to the plaintiffs’ attorneys, into the 
corporate treasury.  See DGCL §145(a) (permitting indemnification for expenses, 
judgments, and settlements for actions except those “by or in right of the 
corporation”).  Because derivative litigation is asserted by shareholders in the 
corporation’s name, it is an action “by or in right of the corporation.”  To allow 
indemnification in such situations would be circular: the director paying the 
settlement to the corporation only to be given back the same amount by the 
corporation as indemnification.  See generally Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. 
Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and Liability Insurance, 51 BUS. 
LAW. 573, 580 (1996) (“The theory is that the corporation would be indemnifying 
the director or officer for a settlement ultimately paid to the corporation itself as 
plaintiff.  Certain state legislatures, including Delaware’s, have determined that 
such circularity of payment is unacceptable.”) (citation omitted).  Delaware does, 
however, permit corporations to indemnify directors for defense costs incurred by 
directors and officers in reaching settlement or judgment.  DGCL §145(b).  Finally, 
although the SEC has long maintained that indemnification for securities law claims 
is contrary to public policy, it is firmly established that the settlement of federal 
securities law claims may be indemnified.  See, e.g., Raychem Corp. v. Federal Ins. 
Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
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pursuant to the terms of its Side B coverage.44  Third, when a 
company is not legally permitted to indemnify its directors and 
officers, as in the settlement of derivative actions, the insurer will pay 
pursuant to the company’s Side A coverage.45 
The result of all of this is that an insurer’s Side A coverage 
obligations are triggered principally when liabilities arise from the 
settlement of derivative litigation or when the company is insolvent.  
Otherwise, and in the vast majority of cases, the liability falls on the 
corporation in the form of an indemnification obligation to its 
managers.46  Side B coverage then shifts this liability, albeit at a 
higher retention, to the third-party insurer.47  The basis for both forms 
of coverage, it is important to note, is the appearance of a claim 
against the company’s managers.  Neither Side A nor Side B coverage 
is available to cover liabilities that the corporation itself may have to a 
party in any given action. 
Side C coverage emerged to fill this void.  Evolving first as a 
solution to the disputes between insurance companies and corporate 
defendants over what portion of a securities settlement ought to be 
allocated to the managers (and therefore reimbursed by the insurer 
under the corporation’s Side B coverage) versus to the corporation 
(and therefore uncovered and paid directly by the corporation),48 Side 
 
44 Side B coverage has higher retentions than Side A coverage, which may have no 
retention at all.  See Hartford Specimen Policy, §VI.F. and Declarations Items D 
(retentions). 
45 A slight wrinkle arises when a corporation’s legal ability to indemnify diverges 
from its financial capacity to do so.  Most policies resolve this issue by creating a 
“financial insolvency” exception to the presumptive indemnification provision 
which requires the insurer to reimburse individual managers under Side A of the 
policy when the corporation is financially unable to indemnify them.  See Hartford 
Specimen Policy §VI.F. (providing Financial Insolvency exception); §IV.G. 
(defining financial insolvency as the status resulting from the appointment of a 
receiver, liquidator, or trustee to supervise or liquidate the company or the company 
becoming a debtor in possession).  These provisions allow managers of insolvent 
firms to collect insurance proceeds without becoming subject to the higher retention 
amounts and coinsurance payments required when a corporation otherwise refuses 
to indemnify. 
46 Don A. Bailey, Side-A Only Coverage, Feb. 11, 2004 (unpublished manuscript on 
file with author) (reporting that “the vast majority of Claims covered under a D&O 
Policy are indemnified by the Company”). 
47 See supra note 44. 
48 See, e.g., Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(recognizing the insurer’s right to allocation unless insurer has improperly refused 
to defend the insured or has made no claim to separate the portion of the settlement 
for which it was liable); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, 64 F.3d 1282 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying “larger settlement rule,” entitling 
corporation to reimbursement of all settlement costs where corporation’s liability is 
purely derivative of liability of insured officers and directors) ; First Fidelity 
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C coverage moots the allocation issue by insuring the corporation 
itself against direct claims.49  Typical policy language provides: 
[T]he Insurer will pay on behalf of the Company Loss which 
the Company shall become legally obligated to pay as a 
result of a Securities Claim… against the Company for a 
Wrongful Act…50 
To ensure that the company retains some “skin in the game” at 
settlement, insurers may insist on a higher retention amount for Side 
C claims as well as a significant co-insurance percentage.51  Still, Side 
C coverage is the final step in the process of shifting the cost of 
shareholder litigation to a third party insurer. 
 Although each of these arrangements—Side A, B, and C 
coverage—may be referred to generally as D&O insurance, the 
collective label may be misleading since only Side A coverage insures 
the directors and officers.  Side B and Side C coverages are for the 
corporation.  Nevertheless, referring to the arrangement as a whole as 
D&O insurance underscores the broader point that corporations buy 
insurance packages.  Pure Side A (or B or C) coverage is rare.  
Coverage types are mixed to achieve the distinct insurance goals of: 
(1) protecting managers from personal liability for shareholder 
litigation, (2) protecting the company from indirect liability, through 
its indemnification obligations, for shareholder litigation, and (3) 
 
Bancorp v. Nat’l Union, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS3977, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 
1994) (“[B]oth the directors and officers as well as the corporate entity faced 
liability in the underlying litigation.  The mere fact that liability arises exclusively 
from the conduct of the insured… does not provide a basis for the insurer to be 
responsible for the liability of those who are uninsured.”); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cont’l 
Cas. Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (addressing the issue of allocation 
between covered and non-covered parties and holding that the insurer bore the 
burden of proving that the ultimate allocation was reasonable in light of the 
“relative exposures” of the parties).  See also Monteleone, Bailey & McCarrick, 
Allocation of Defense Costs and Settlements Under D&O Policies, INSIGHTS, Vol. 
5, No. 11 (Nov. 1991). 
49 See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 43, at 618-20 (noting the various responses 
of insurers to the problem of allocation disputes, including predetermined allocation 
agreements and entity coverage).  
50 Hartford Specimen Policy, §I.C.  A securities claim is defined in the policy to 
include claims by securities holders alleging a violation of the Securities Act of 
1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or rules and regulations promulgated 
pursuant to either act as well as similar state laws and includes claims “arising from 
the purchase or sale of, or offer to purchase or sell, any Security issued by the 
company” regardless of whether the transaction is with the company or over the 
open market.  Id. at §IV.M.  If the company purchases Side C coverage, the 
definitions of “claim,” “loss,” and “wrongful act” expand to include the company 
and not just the directors and officers. 
51 See Hartford Specimen Policy, Declarations Page, Item D (providing for separate 
retention amount for A, B, and C coverage) and E (providing for coinsurance 
percentages for securities claims). 
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protecting the company from direct liability from securities litigation.  
What all of these goals have in common, however, is the shifting of 
risk from shareholder litigation, in whole or in part, to a third party 
insurer. 
 
B. Why Corporations Buy D&O Insurance 
The vast majority of American public companies—a proportion 
consistently reported at well over 90%—buy D&O insurance.52  This 
presents a puzzle.  Insurance, after all, is not free.  Insurance 
premiums reflect not only the policy’s risk—an actuarially 
determined probability of loss—but also a loading fee reflecting the 
insurer’s costs and profits.53  This means that it always costs more to 
buy insurance for a risk than to bear it oneself.54  Moreover, unlike 
individuals, for whom third-party insurance may be the only available 
means of spreading risk, corporations are themselves sophisticated 
risk-shifting mechanisms, ultimately allocating the risk of business 
failure to shareholders whose losses, thanks to limited liability, cannot 
exceed the extent of their investment.  Furthermore, because 
shareholders can spread this risk costlessly (or nearly so) by holding a 
diversified portfolio of stocks, it is a puzzle why corporations buy 
insurance at all.  Why would corporations pay extra for something 
that their shareholders can get for free in the capital markets? 
For basic property and casualty insurance, economists have 
largely answered this question.55  First, features of the tax code, 
 
52 Tillinghast 2003 Directors and Officers Liability Survey, supra note 35, at fig. 3 
(showing that since 1997 90% or more of U.S. respondents have purchased D&O 
insurance, with 97% of U.S. respondents purchasing coverage in 2003). 
53 KARL BORCH, ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE 13-15, 163 (1990) (describing the 
insurance premium as the sum of the expected claim payment under the insurance 
contract, the administrative expenses of the insurance company and the reward to 
the insurer for bearing the risk, later referring to the difference between expected 
claims payments and the insurance premium as the “loading” of the contract). 
54 As a result, it is thought to be rational for individuals to purchase insurance only 
for very large potential losses that, if incurred, would significantly diminish their 
quality of life and irrational to insure against small losses—by buying extended 
consumer warranties, for example—that one could easily bear oneself.  [CITATION 
PENDING] 
55 Mayers and Smith addressed this puzzle in a series of articles.  See generally 
David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, 
55 J. BUS. 281 (1982); David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate 
Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market, 63 J. Bus. 19 
(1990); David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Corporate Insurance and the 
Underinvestment Problem, 54 J. RISK & INS. 45 (1987).  See also Richard MacMinn 
& James Garven, On Corporate Insurance, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 541. 
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including the availability of deductions for insurance premiums but 
not for internal reserves,56 create incentives for corporations to 
purchase insurance rather than to self-insure.57  In addition, because 
transaction costs in bankruptcy are high,58 creditors and shareholders 
alike may prefer that the corporation purchase insurance against large 
potential losses in order to keep the firm out of bankruptcy.59  
Creditors may also insist that corporations insure major assets in order 
to protect the security of their loans.60  Some forms of property and 
casualty coverage may thus add value to the corporation. 
These explanations, however, do not apply to the purchase of 
D&O insurance.  Although there may still be some tax advantage to 
buying insurance over reserving, such advantages shrink with the size 
of coverage.  Because D&O policies and premiums are smaller than 
property and casualty coverages, the relevant tax deductions as well 
as the costs associated with creating self-insurance reserves are also 
smaller.61  Similarly, because likely D&O losses are a fraction of 
potential losses under a general property and casualty policy, they 
pose less of a bankruptcy threat.62  Finally, there is no evidence that 
creditors insist on D&O insurance as a condition for making corporate 
loans.  All of which suggests that the corporate benefits from the 
purchase of D&O insurance are considerably smaller than the 
corporate benefits from the purchase of basic property and casualty 
insurance.  The costs, however, remain the same.63  The 
predominance of D&O insurance therefore is all the more puzzling.64 
Still, at least one aspect of the corporate purchase of D&O 
insurance is easy to explain.  Recall that D&O insurance has two 
parts—Side A, benefiting individual managers, and Sides B and C, 
 
56 [CITE IRC.  CONFIRM ACCURACY.] 
57 See Mayers & Smith, Demand, supra note 55, at 289-91, 294-95 (describing and 
modeling tax incentives for corporate insurance purchases); MacMinn & Garven, 
Corporate Insurance, supra note 55, at 557-60 (same). 
58 See J. B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337 (1977). 
59 See Mayers & Smith, Demand, supra note 55, at 284-85; MacMinn & Garven, 
Corporate Insurance, supra note 55, at 548-50. 
60 See Mayers & Smith, Demand, supra note 55, at 287 (noting that “[b]ond 
indentures frequently contain covenants requiring the firm to maintain certain types 
of insurance coverage”); MacMinn & Garven, Corporate Insurance, supra note 55, 
at 550-57 (modeling corporate insurance as a means to mitigate agency problems 
between corporate managers and bondholders). 
61 [CITATION COMPARING SIZES OF GENERAL CORPORATE 
POLICIES V. D&O POLICIES] 
62 [NOTE SAYING WHY AND PROVIDING STATISTICS TO SUPPORT] 
63 The cost of coverage includes a loading fee that is proportional to the total 
amount of coverage.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
64 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (noting that over 95% of American 
corporations purchase D&O insurance). 
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benefiting the corporation itself.  Because Side A coverage protects 
individuals, it can be justified on the basis of individual risk 
aversion.65  Corporate managers insist on D&O insurance to protect 
their personal wealth from the risk of shareholder litigation, making 
such coverage necessary to attract qualified persons to board service 
and executive-level employment.66  Side A coverage is thus explained 
as an aspect of the individual’s compensation package, a cost that the 
labor market has allocated to the employer.67  However, this is not a 
complete explanation for D&O insurance.  It does not explain why 
corporations also purchase coverage, under Side B and C of the 
policy, for the corporation itself. 
Indeed, entity-level coverage for the risk of shareholder litigation 
is particularly puzzling since the corporation controls the governance 
processes that create litigation risk.  Because corporations can 
mitigate this litigation risk by improving their governance structure 
and shareholders can eliminate the risk of business failure by holding 
a diversified portfolio, the party in the best position to bear the risk of 
shareholder litigation would seem to be the corporation itself.68  
Moreover, once the loading fees associated with D&O insurance are 
taken into account, the costs of entity-level coverage appear to 
outweigh the benefits.  Entity-level D&O insurance, in other words, 
appears to be a negative net present value investment.  Why, then, do 
corporations buy it? 
 
65 See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS, 207-
209 (17th ed. 2001) (describing risk-aversion and its relationship to the diminishing 
marginal utility of income). 
66 Participants in the insurance market cite this as the basic explanation for D&O 
insurance.  See, e.g., Randy Parr, Directors and Officers Insurance, in D&O 
LIABILITY INSURANCE 2004: DIRECTORS & OFFICERS UNDER FIRE 13 (PLI 2004) 
(reporting that “it is difficult for corporations to attract and keep outside directors”). 
67 Coverage for individual directors and officers was recognized as an aspect of 
compensation early in the evolution of D&O insurance.  See, e.g., Johnston, supra 
note 30, at 2013 (stating that the fact that the corporation paid D&O premiums “was 
nothing more than another form of compensation for the executives and another 
way of attracting capable managers”).  Interestingly, the first D&O policies 
allocated a portion of the premium, usually 10%, to the individual insured.  See 
Wallace, More on Sitting Ducks: (Officers and Directors, That Is), INSURANCE, 
April 16, 1966, 32, 36 (describing then-typical “ration of 90% of the premium to the 
corporation and 10% to the officers and directors”).  This aspect of the policy has 
been discontinued, presumably because individual directors and officers asked for 
and received corporate payment of the full premium. 
68 Although D&O insurance may guarantee a recovery ex post for shareholders who 
sue a bankrupt or insolvent firm, ex ante shareholders could more efficiently 
manage the risk of corporate bankruptcy by holding a diversified portfolio of shares.  
The diversification point similarly moots arguments regarding the insurer’s 
efficiencies in claims administration. 
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If the purchase of entity-level D&O insurance is not a sensible 
investment for the firm, it may nevertheless serve the interests of the 
firm’s managers.  Managers who, unlike diversified shareholders, 
have a significant personal stake in the firm they manage, have a 
greater personal incentive to avoid corporate-level losses.69  Even if 
losses are unlikely to lead to insolvency (and manager 
unemployment), they may still impact corporate assets and earnings, 
drawing unwelcome scrutiny from the capital markets including, 
perhaps, a challenge to the management of the firm.70  More directly, 
losses resulting in a reduction in the firm’s earnings are likely to have 
an impact on the managers’ compensation.  The probable losses from 
shareholder litigation are in precisely this category—too small to 
jeopardize the solvency of the firm, but large enough to put 
management’s paycheck at risk.  This may go a long way towards 
explaining the purchase of entity-level D&O insurance. 
Managers may purchase entity-level D&O coverage because their 
compensation packages are based on accounting measures of 
performance, especially earnings, and because shareholder litigation 
is likely to have a direct adverse impact on corporate earnings.71  
Entity-level D&O insurance allows managers to avoid these shocks to 
earnings.72  By buying D&O insurance, managers essentially trade 
 
69 As a general matter, this incentive arrangement is good for shareholders since 
managers that seeks to avoid losses obviously benefits shareholders’ portfolios 
overall.  In this one instance, however, because using D&O insurance to avoid 
corporate level losses is a negative net present value investment, shareholder and 
manager interests are not aligned. 
70 The challenge may be in the form of a proxy fight or an unwanted takeover bid.  
See generally Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. 
POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper 
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1164 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case 
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Michael 
C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific 
Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6 (1983).  Significant reductions in earnings or assets 
may also result in a credit downgrade.  See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Regulating the 
Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 79 (2004) (describing how credit ratings 
work and what they signal to the market). 
71 See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (detailing defects 
in the design of executive compensation packages that lead to similarly distorted 
incentives). 
72 In addition, a positive externality (from the managers’ point of view) of this 
system may be that shareholder litigation becomes a less noteworthy event since it 
is handled almost exclusively by the third party insurer and rarely threatens the 
corporation itself.  This may not be the case if corporations had to handle this 
litigation by itself.  Because the corporation’s risk of loss from any claim would 
thus be substantially higher, shareholder attention might be more focused on the 
company each time a shareholder claim arose. 
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large but infrequent expected losses for smaller annual costs in order 
to smooth earnings volatility.73  Entity-level coverage, in other words, 
is a form of earnings management.  Managers buy it to protect their 
compensation in spite of the fact that it is a negative net present value 
investment for the corporation.  In this way, entity level D&O 
coverage is a paradigmatic example of agency costs—the dislocation 
between shareholder and manager incentives.74 
 Why, then, do corporations buy D&O insurance?  The answer to 
this question, it seems, has two parts.  First, corporations buy Side A 
coverage in order to attract risk averse individuals to their boardrooms 
and executive suites.  The second part of the answer is more complex 
and, perhaps, more sinister.  Corporations buy entity-level coverage 
under Side B and C of the D&O policy because they are run by selfish 
managers who are willing to invest corporate assets in negative net 
present value projects in order to protect their own compensation 
packages. 
 
IV.D&O INSURANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 Once corporations purchase D&O insurance, regardless 
ultimately of why they buy it, the risk of shareholder litigation is 
shifted, in whole or in part, to a third party insurer.  Given the 
relationship between corporate governance and shareholder 
litigation,75 the insurer subjects its capital reserves to risks largely 
determined by the insured’s corporate governance.  The implications 
of this relationship between D&O insurance and governance risk are 
explored in this Part. 
 
73 See Buckberg, et. al., supra note 17 (reporting that the mean securities settlement 
in 2004 was $27.1 million, while the median settlement was $5.3 million). 
74 Accord John M.R. Chalmers, et al., Managerial Opportunism?  Evidence from 
Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Purchases, 57 J. FIN. 609, 610-11 (2002) 
(investigating the hypothesis that managers are willing to buy large amounts of 
D&O coverage at high premiums because they receive all of the benefits of the 
coverage but bear the costs only in proportion to their fractional ownership of the 
firm’s equity and finding, in a sample of IPO-stage firms, that “managers choos[e] 
abnormally high D&O insurance coverage based on their belief that their shares are 
priced too high”); John E. Core, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and 
Officers’ Insurance, 64 J. RISK & INS. 63, 81 (1997) (investigating the hypothesis 
that more entrenched managers are more likely to purchase D&O insurance and 
finding, in a sample of Canadian firms, that the “firms with higher excess director 
pay… are more likely to carry D&O insurance coverage and purchase higher 
limits,” suggesting that managers bundle compensation and insurance because they 
do not internalize the cost of either).  
75 See supra Part II. 
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A. Pricing the Policy: Correlating Corporate Governance and D&O 
Liability Risk 
 Insurance companies are experts at assessing risk.  Because the 
success of an insurer’s business depends upon taking in more capital 
than it pays out, the insurer must develop an ability to assess the 
probable payout obligations of each exposure and then charge an 
appropriate premium for the risk.  Just as providers of auto insurance 
must assess the likelihood that a particular driver will cause an 
accident, a D&O underwriter must determine the likelihood that a 
particular management team will incur shareholder litigation.  D&O 
underwriters therefore ought to develop categories of high risk 
corporate governance and low risk corporate governance just as car 
insurance underwriters develop categories of high and low risk 
drivers.76 
 Insurers may assess a prospective insured’s governance risk at the 
time the D&O policy is first underwritten and then, on an ongoing 
basis, at each annual renewal.  Each year, the underwriter has the 
option of refusing to renew a policy or of increasing a premium in 
response to new information about a firm’s governance risk.  
Similarly, because D&O policies are bought and sold in competitive 
markets,77 prospective insureds have an opportunity to shop for the 
most comprehensive and least expensive coverage.  Each party to the 
insurance arrangement is thus constrained by competition.  A 
company with very poor corporate governance may be unable to find 
a willing underwriter, and an underwriter that prices its coverage very 
high may be unable to find clients. 
 
76 Governance risk may not be the only significant pricing point for the policy, but 
other factors should wash out when compared across industries or across different 
markets.  If a particular industry, for example, is a likely target of shareholder 
litigation, firms in that industry may pay relatively high premiums compared to 
companies in other industries, but when compared to each other, pricing differences 
should be expected largely to track governance risk.  Industry newsletters generally 
confirm this view.  See, e.g., Lynna Goch, Falling Markets, Rising Risks, BEST’S 
REVIEW, May 2001, at 56 (stating that: “D&O underwriters price policies based on 
market capitalization of public companies….  Market conditions, type of risk, 
industry and terms of the policy also affect the pricing.”); Lisa S. Howard, 
European D&O Carriers Swearing Off ‘Drive-By’ Underwriting, NAT’L 
UNDERWRITER, Dec. 2, 2002, at 20 (reporting that underwriters are once again 
“digging deep to really analyze a company, its board structure, who the people are 
and what their history is, what business they’re in, and how they conduct their 
business.”). 
77 Chubb and AIG are the leading primary underwriters in the U.S. market, with 
Chubb, The Hartford, and XL Specialty leading in the excess limits market.  See 
Tillinghast 2003 Directors and Officers Liability Survey, supra note 35, at 7. 
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The policy application is the first step in the underwriting process 
and the insurer’s most basic tool to collect information concerning a 
prospective insured.78  Application forms are required of both new 
and renewal applicants, but the questions asked of each differ.  New 
applicants are asked whether they or any subsidiary corporation has 
previously held a D&O policy and, if so, are asked for further details 
concerning the identity of the previous insurer, the previous policy’s 
limit and deductible, and the policy premium.79  This information may 
allow the underwriter to make an initial assessment of the prospective 
insured, using the reputation of the previous insurer to judge the 
overall acceptability of the risk profile and the prior policy’s limits, 
deductible, and premium as a proxy for the prior underwriter’s 
ultimate assessment of the risk presented by the prospective insured.  
The application form also asks new applicants about any prior claims 
experience and whether any covered person has knowledge of acts or 
omissions that may give rise to a claim.80  Both new and renewal 
applicants are asked about recent or planned corporate restructurings, 
including mergers & acquisitions activity, reorganizations, and sales 
or distributions of businesses as well as plans to register an offering of 
securities.81  New and renewal applicants are also asked to attach to 
the application a list identifying all directors and officers, the 
company’s most recent annual report, proxy notices, and recent 
securities law filings as well as the company’s most recent interim 
financial statements.82  The apparent purpose of these documents is to 
enable the underwriter to perform due diligence on the insured, but 
perhaps as importantly, these documents become incorporated into the 
application which becomes the basis of the policy and, if they contain 
a material misstatement or omission, a possible grounds for rescission 
of the insurance policy.83  This feature of the application bonds a 
 
78 See E-Mail from Joseph P. Monteleone, Vice President, Hartford Financial 
Products, dated Feb. 16, 2005 (“completion of the application typically begins the 
process and precedes any meetings between the prospective insured and the 
underwriters”) [hereinafter Monteleone E-mail]. 
79 The Hartford, Proposal for Directors, Officers, and Company Liability Insurance, 
Form DO 00 R288 05 1103, at item 4a [hereinafter, Hartford Specimen 
Application]. 
80 Id., at item 5. 
81 Id., at item 3. 
82 Id., at item 7. 
83 The Hartford Specimen Application provides in its boilerplate that “ALL WRITTEN 
STATEMENTS AND MATERIALS FURNISHED TO THE INSURER IN CONJUNCTION WITH 
THIS PROPOSAL FORM ARE HEREBY INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THIS 
PROPOSAL AND MADE A PART HEREOF” and also that “THIS PROPOSAL SHALL BE THE 
BASIS OF THE CONTRACT SHOULD A POLICY BE ISSUED.”  Id.  This language in the 
application is immediately followed by state-specific fraud warnings.  
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corporation to the credibility of all statements made in the application 
and in any documents supplied to the insurer in connection with the 
application.  A corporation defeats the purpose of buying insurance if 
it supplies false or misleading statements in connection with the 
application since such statements could be used by the insurer to deny 
coverage should a dispute later arise. 
In many cases, the information supplied in the policy application 
is supplemented by meetings during which prospective insured makes 
presentations, described by participants as similar to an IPO road-
show,84 to prospective underwriters.85  These presentations showcase, 
among other things, the prospective insured’s corporate governance.  
Insurance brokers counsel clients to highlight positive governance 
terms.  One document I obtained from a broker advises prospective 
insureds to discuss which outside auditing firm they use and to 
disclose whether they also purchase non-audit services from the same 
firm, essentially flagging a key corporate governance issue that arose 
in the wake of the Enron collapse.86  The same document urges 
corporations to emphasize any steps taken to improve its governance, 
including “[p]articipating or completing any Corporate Governance 
workshops,” and lists as other items to accentuate: the directors’ 
equity interest in the company, how directors are screened and 
chosen, and whether the corporation has separated the roles of board 
chair and chief executive officer, all items that have repeatedly arisen 
in recent discussions of corporate governance.87 
 
84 D&O Interview, Oct. 12, 2004 (transcript on file with author).  These meetings 
are organized by the company’s insurance broker and involve key company 
officials, typically the CFO and occasionally the CEO, and one or more insurance 
underwriters. 
85 See Monteleone E-mail, supra note 78 (“In the case of a very large (e.g. Fortune 
1000) risk with multiple layers of coverage being sought, there may be an in-person 
meeting with the primary [insurer] and participation of excess insurers by 
teleconference.”). 
86 See “Company Facts” (unpublished industry document on file with author).  An 
introductory passage counsels:  
The purpose of this list is to highlight all the important facts that we want to be 
sure the underwriters know.  If we can include any of the below items in our 
discussions, we will have set the stage to deliver a risk profile that is desirable to 
the underwriting community. 
Id.  See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and 
Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1233, 1237-39 (2002) (discussing problems arising from accounting firms 
that sell both auditing and advisory or consulting services). 
87 Id.  On the role of importance of these specific governance provisions, see 
generally authors cited at supra note 8. 
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Another document prepared by a D&O broker to help clients 
prepare for these meetings advises on “Examples of Questions Being 
Asked by D&O Underwriters” and counsels clients to prepare for 
specific questions involving related party transactions,88 earnings 
management,89 and takeover planning.90  In this document, the 
company is asked to consider how it responds to pressures to hit 
earnings targets and to address any company practices that might be 
criticized as earnings management.91  The questions also highlight 
general corporate governance issues including: 
How does ‘bad news’ flow upward within the organization?  
Does the corporate culture encourage such news to be 
brought to the attention of senior management?  Are 
significant developments shared with the Board of Directors 
as they become available?  How does the company select a 
new member of the Board?  How does the search process 
take place?92 
All of these questions go directly to the quality a firm’s corporate 
governance.  Earnings management and related-party transactions 
may trigger either or both of securities litigation and derivative 
lawsuits.93  Similarly, a board’s takeover planning may indicate 
entrenchment and whether shareholder suits are likely to be brought 
in connection with acquisition activity.94  Perhaps most significant, 
however, is the question of intra-corporate information flows.  
 
88 Unpublished industry document on file with author.  Listed questions include: 
“Does the Parent Company or any Subsidiary utilize any off balance sheet entities 
for financial transactions?  Does any member of the Board of Directors have any 
outside affiliation or any common business interest with any major shareholder 
(10% or more)?  Within the past three years, did the Parent Company or any 
Subsidiary engage in any related party transactions?” 
89 Id.  These questions include: “Has the Parent Company changed auditors or 
restated its financials in the past three years?  Please discuss the extent of the 
experience of the Audit Committee Members.  How often do they meet?  Does the 
Internal Audit Function have a direct report to the Audit Committee/Board of 
Directors?  Has your external auditor approved revenue recognition practices?  
What is the length and scope of the company’s relationship with its outside 
auditors?  What percentage of fees has the company paid for auditing vs. consultant 
fees?  Are there any planned changes to this mix going forward?  How does 
management cope with pressure to meet ‘street’ expectations?  Where might the 
company be subject to criticism, if at all, for ‘earnings management’?  How strong 
are internal controls over the financial reporting process?” 
90 See id., (asking: “How does the company review potential mergers and 
acquisitions?”). 
91 See id. 
92 Id. 
93 See Thompson & Sale, supra note 14. 
94 See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 12. 
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Although not tied to a specific shareholder claim, answers to this 
question may indicate how potential problems are handled within the 
organization and perhaps handled before they give rise to shareholder 
litigation.  In this way, the underwriter appears to be looking for clues 
to the health of the organization that go beyond issues tied to specific 
governance terms or types of litigation. 
The insurer’s ability to interact with corporate officials, whether 
when the policy is first underwritten or later, on an ongoing basis, 
allows its assessment of corporate governance to be based on a 
broader set of factors than would be revealed by charter terms or 
public documents.95  When asked what governance factors seem to 
matter most, one broker remarked to me:  
Let me tell you something.  I’ve seen over 50 models of all 
different underwriters, and there’s one model that works and 
it’s the best model:  It’s the people.  It’s simply the people.  
Who are you dealing with?  Who are they, and how do they 
act?  Are they in it for themselves or are they in it for their 
shareholders?96 
The ability to take such intangible measures of governance quality 
into account may provide the D&O insurer with a better perspective 
on governance quality than outsiders with little or no access to 
company officials.  Underwriters have the ability to ask questions and 
force prospective insureds to make representations and revelations 
regarding their corporate governance that are not always available to 
outsiders.  Moreover, because these representations can be 
incorporated into the policy and, if false, form the basis of a rescission 
action, they can be expected to have a level of credibility and candor 
that most statements made by corporate officials do not.97  D&O 
insurers thus form their estimate of an insured’s governance quality 
on the basis of credible private information, unavailable to other 
market participants. 
 In addition to this unique access to information, insurers have the 
right incentives to perform a careful analysis of the prospective 
insured’s governance risk.  First, unlike other third party assessments 
of corporate governance, including equity analysts, Institutional 
Shareholder Services, and debt ratings agencies such as Moody's and 
Standard & Poor's, insurers lose capital when they evaluate a 
company incorrectly.  Although it is possible to argue that other third-
party corporate governance ratings also suffer when they are 
incorrect, because these tend to operate on a fee-for-services model, 
 
95 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
96 D&O Interview, morning, Nov. 12, 2004, (transcript on file with author).   
97 See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of the 
application into the policy, making it a basis for a rescission action). 
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which would incur losses only if repeated inaccuracies threatened 
their reputation, the sensitivity of these services to the cost of wrong 
guesses is considerably less direct than an insurer’s.98  Second, unlike 
mutual and pension funds and other diversified equity investors, 
insurance companies cannot eliminate the non-systematic risk of firm-
specific governance.  To be sure, insurers build portfolios of insureds, 
but insurance underwriting takes place in a competitive market and 
not every insurer receives a portion of every risk.  As a result, each 
insurer’s portfolio of insureds is different, with insurers that are 
skilled at distinguishing good and bad risks predictably building better 
overall portfolios than those who are not.99  Because diversified 
equity investors can eliminate these kinds of non-systematic risk, 
there is less incentive for institutional investors to develop expertise 
in actively distinguishing good and bad risks.  Third, unlike bond 
holders, who can control their downside risk through a combination of 
contract, security, and priority, insurers have no security interest and 
no system of priority to protect their rights if their risk assessments 
are ultimately wrong. 
 Given the structure of their incentives and their unique access to 
information, one can expect insurers to develop expertise in 
distinguishing good and bad governance risks and to build these 
assessments into their models for pricing D&O insurance.  Simply 
stated, how much a firm pays for a specific amount of D&O insurance 
should provide a reliable outside assessment of its corporate 
governance.   
This relationship has a number of significant implications.  First, 
it could cause corporations to improve their overall governance 
structure since worse governance leads to higher premiums—that is, 
higher firm costs—which could be eliminated by improving 
governance.  This possibility is explored in Section B, below.  
Second, even if corporations do not respond to differences in the cost 
of D&O insurance pricing by optimizing their corporate governance, 
the price that a firm pays for D&O insurance could convey an 
important signal to investors and other market participants.  This 
possibility is explored in Section C, below. 
 
 
98 Moreover, because their success is not tied directly to the ratings they generate, 
but to the organizations that hire and pay them, ratings agencies’ evaluations can be 
captured by other kinds agendas—e.g., either pro- or anti- regulatory—that do not 
necessarily correspond to accurate evaluations of governance risk. 
99 Again, this is the problem of adverse selection.  See Akerloff, supra note 5. 
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B. Incentive Effects 
Businesses can improve their earnings in two ways: they can 
increase revenues or cut costs.  Insurance expenses, including D&O 
premiums, are a source of cost.  It follows, then, that corporations 
could improve their earnings by cutting them and, in order to create a 
competitive advantage, have ample incentive to do so.  One way to 
cut insurance costs, of course, is not to buy coverage.  As discussed 
above, however, corporations tend to purchase coverage even if it is 
on the whole a negative net present value investment.100  Another way 
that corporations might try to manage insurance cost is to eliminate 
those governance features that lead to higher D&O premiums. 
Building upon the hypothesis that insurers charge different rates 
to companies with different corporate governance structures, D&O 
premiums might provide an incentive for corporations to improve 
corporate governance.  By continually optimizing its governance 
structure, a corporation ought to find that it pays consistently less for 
D&O insurance than its competitors.  Better corporate governance, in 
other words, would mean lower D&O insurance costs and, therefore, 
higher earnings and improved share values relative to competitors 
who have not also optimized their governance structure.   
One problem with this incentives story is that while D&O 
insurance premiums are by no means small—the average premium for 
U.S. for-profit companies was $1,237,000 in 2003101—they may not 
be large enough to spur large changes in corporate governance 
policies.  If, as seems to be the case, the D&O insurance premium has 
a relatively small overall effect on a corporation’s revenue stream, the 
marginal costs of regularly reviewing and revising internal 
governance policies—involving expensive legal and financial 
advisors as well as the time and attention of the general counsel and 
top level management—may easily outweigh the marginal benefits of 
savings in policy premiums. 
Also, insofar as the corporation’s reason for purchasing entity-
level coverage is based upon agency costs within the firm,102 it is 
rather quixotic to expect corporations to cut D&O expenses in order 
to increase earnings.  It is always true that managers could make their 
corporations run better by trimming agency costs.  Managers could 
improve the bottom line by cutting their salaries, giving back their 
benefits packages, and firing their cronies.  But it is also always true 
that they will be generally disinclined to do so.  In this way, just as it 
 
100 See supra Part III.B. 
101 Tillinghast 2003 Directors and Officers Liability Survey, supra note 35, at fig. 1 
(reporting the median premium for these companies as $562,000). 
102 See supra Part III.B. 
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would not be surprising for D&O premiums to be higher for 
companies with bad managers, it would not be surprising for bad 
managers to refuse to be good in order to reduce an expense that is 
ultimately borne by the shareholders.  Any reduction in agency costs 
would be better for shareholders, but if bad managers are not willing 
to fix these problems generally, it is unlikely that the additional 
corporate expense of marginally higher D&O premiums would spur 
them do so. 
In sum, in spite of the incentive effects of D&O premiums—
essentially, better companies pay less—one ought not to expect the 
insurance premium alone to push companies to become better.  The 
marginal costs of continually optimizing corporate governance might 
outweigh the marginal benefit of reduced D&O premiums.  Moreover, 
to the extent that D&O insurance purchases correspond to agency 
costs, managers are unlikely to reduce their private benefits to save 
costs borne by shareholders. 
 
C. Signaling Effects 
Even if the cost of D&O insurance does not provide a sufficiently 
strong incentive to spur a corporation to optimize its corporate 
governance, it may nevertheless signal important information to 
market participants.  First, the type of insurance package purchased 
by a particular firm may signal information concerning the firm’s 
likely motives in purchasing it and, by extension, some gauge of the 
extent of agency costs within the organization.  Second, following the 
hypothesis that insurers develop expertise in separating good 
governance risks in order to charge an appropriate premium, the price 
of a firm’s D&O policy represents the insurer’s assessment of the 
quality of the firm’s corporate governance.  Equipped with the 
information revealed by these signals, investors and other capital 
market participants may react by discounting the shares of firms 
revealed to have high agency costs or low-quality corporate 
governance, ultimately creating another incentive (avoiding this 
discount) for firms to improve their corporate governance. 
The type of D&O coverage that a corporation purchases could 
convey an important signal to the market.  As discussed in Part III 
above, D&O insurance may be intended to benefit either or both of 
the corporation’s individual managers and the corporate entity itself.  
Insofar as the insurance is intended to benefit individuals, it may be a 
necessary feature of the benefits package required to attract top-level 
talent to the firm.  Entity-level coverage, however, may trace to 
agency costs.   
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Because it is simple to distinguish whether D&O coverage was 
purchased to benefit individual managers, on the one hand, or the 
corporate entity, on the other, a company’s D&O package can serve 
as a simple proxy for agency costs.  Side A coverage only benefits 
individuals while Side B and Side C coverages only benefit the 
corporate entity.103  A corporation purchasing only Side A coverage 
may suffer less from agency costs than a firm that has bought a large 
amount of Side B and Side C coverage as well.104  Market participants 
could learn this information simply by reviewing the types of 
coverage purchased by a particular insured. 
Second, insofar as corporations buy individual coverage in order 
to persuade directors to sit on their boards, the question arises as to 
how much coverage these individuals require in order to accept the 
job.  Other things being equal, a relatively high level of coverage 
(high limits, low retentions) signals individual discomfort with the 
firm’s governance risk while, by contrast, low limits and high 
retentions suggest that individual managers do not expect their firm to 
generate significant liabilities from shareholder litigation.  In this 
way, the level of coverage alone may signal the managers’ own 
assessment of governance risk. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the price the corporation 
pays for its coverage conveys important information concerning the 
corporation’s governance quality.  If firms do not continually 
optimize their corporate governance and firms with worse corporate 
governance pay more for D&O insurance than firms with better 
corporate governance, market participants could use D&O insurance 
pricing as a proxy to evaluate a firm’s corporate governance.  The 
most obvious place to look for this information is the firm’s D&O 
premium.   
A company’s insurance premium could be converted into a proxy 
for governance quality with a few relatively simple adjustments.  
First, because insurance premiums depend in part on the coverage 
 
103 See supra Part III.A. 
104 My conversations with insurance industry participants revealed that some firms 
do in fact purchase “Side A only coverage.”  As one executive with a major D&O 
underwriter described it to me: 
[A] lot of companies are purchasing what we call Side A insurance only.  …  
[For] two reasons.  Number one, the company is extremely well financed.  We 
don’t care about our own exposure as a company.  You know we’ll handle that…  
But we need to give some comfort to our outside board members in the event we 
ever become insolvent.  We don’t think we will but before someone serves on 
our board they want to know about our D&O insurance. 
D&O Interview, November 12, 2004, afternoon (transcript on file with author).  
Accord Bailey, supra note 46. 
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limits and the firm’s retention, premium data must be adjusted to 
effective coverage amounts.  This, however, would be a relatively 
easy adjustment to make, given a broad data-set including insurance 
premiums, limits, and retentions for many companies.  Second, in 
addition to these features of the insurance policy itself, insurance 
premiums may correlate to other features of the corporation or its 
business.  Firms within a particular industry—an industry that has 
attracted the attention of Eliot Spitzer, for example—may be subject 
to systematically higher D&O rates than firms in other lines of 
business with less industry-wide risk of shareholder litigation.105  
However, this distortion too could be corrected by comparing D&O 
insurance pricing across a set of firms within a specific industry in 
order to identify norms and outliers.  Finally, insurance premiums 
may correlate to market capitalizations,106 whether because larger 
firms attract more attention in shareholder litigation (perhaps because 
they appear more often on the front page of the Wall Street Journal) 
or because firms with high share prices have farther to fall in 
measuring damages.107  Nevertheless, the influence of market 
capitalization in insurance pricing also can be removed by comparing 
firms with similar market capitalizations. 
Thus, in spite of this noise in insurance prices, on the whole, a 
firm’s premium for D&O insurance should convey important 
information concerning the firm’s corporate governance.  Most 
basically, the more a firm pays, the worse its governance.  Moreover, 
because the insurer risks its own capital in making this assessment, 
the D&O premium functions as a revealed preference and is therefore 
likely to be a reliable indication of the insurer’s best assessment of the 
insured’s governance quality.  Understanding this, fund managers, 
arbitrageurs, and other professional investors can be expected to build 
these signals into their models of firm value.  D&O insurance data 
could thus provide another data point for analysts to crunch as they 
seek to value firms.  If D&O insurance policies reveal negative 
 
105 Accord Howard, supra note 76, at 22 (quoting a managing director at Chubb as 
stating that “if you happen to be in an industry group that insurers perceive as 
extremely high risk at the moment, and you also happen to have your shares listed 
[in the United States], then you’re going to be paying a hell of a lot more premium 
than you did last year”). 
106 See Goch, supra note 76.  John Core and George Kaltchev have both found a 
strong correlation between premium and market capitalization.  See infra Part V.B. 
107 This is true whether the theory of damages is the traditional “out of pocket” 
measure—i.e., the difference between what the plaintiff received and what she 
would have received had their been no fraudulent conduct—or “recessionary” 
damages.  See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 
(1972) (out of pocket damages in securities fraud context); Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 
478 U.S. 647, 659 (1986) (recessionary damages in securities fraud context). 
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information—for example, high premiums or a high degree of entity-
level coverage—the corresponding negative impact in the equity and 
credit markets may provide yet another incentive for firms to optimize 
their corporate governance. 
 
V. DISCLOSING D&O INSURANCE 
 In spite of the fact that the D&O insurer performs an essential 
gatekeeping function in underwriting governance risks, signaling the 
firm’s governance quality in the insurance premium, this signal is not, 
in fact, reaching the market.  Current U.S. law does not require the 
disclosure of D&O policy details although other countries, notably 
Canada, do.  This Part explores the approach of each country’s 
securities regulators to D&O policy details and argues ultimately that 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission should require 
registrants to disclose details concerning their D&O policies on an 
annual basis. 
A. D&O Disclosure Obligations in the United States 
 U.S. law does not require disclosure of D&O policy details, and 
most U.S. companies do not in fact disclose the details of their D&O 
policies.  SEC rule-making is particularly interesting on this point 
because the SEC’s public policy pronouncements regarding 
indemnification are inconsistent with its position on insurance in spite 
of the fact that indemnification and insurance raise many of the same 
issues. 
 Congress has not addressed the issues raised by management 
indemnification and insurance, but the SEC, following Congress’s 
stated intent of inducing compliance with the securities laws, has 
taken a firm position against the indemnification of officers and 
directors for securities law violations.108  The SEC requires that all 
registrants under the Securities Act of 1933 include the following 
language in their registration statements: 
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the 
Securities Act of 1933 may be permitted to directors, officers 
and controlling persons of the registrant pursuant to the 
foregoing provisions, or otherwise, the registrant has been 
 
108 H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 5, 9 (1933); S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 
1st Sess. 5 (1933) (stating an intent “to impose a duty of competence as well as 
innocence” in the Securities Act of 1933).  See generally James M. Landis, The 
Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959) 
(providing a personal and anecdotal account of the passage of the Securities Act). 
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advised that in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission such indemnification is against public policy as 
expressed in the Act and is, therefore, unenforceable.109 
The SEC’s position on indemnification is rooted in the view that 
spreading the cost of legal sanction renders managers less likely to 
comply with the law.110  Because insuring directors and officers 
against these costs would seem to implicate precisely the same policy 
concerns as indemnifying them, it would be reasonable to suppose 
that the SEC similarly opposes D&O insurance.  This supposition, 
however, appears to be incorrect. 
 The SEC takes a milder position on D&O insurance than it takes 
on indemnification.  The SEC has not declared insurance against 
securities law liabilities to be a violation of public policy.  In fact, the 
SEC has arguably endorsed the corporate purchase of D&O 
insurance, stating that the maintenance of a D&O policy, even when 
paid for by the company, will not bar acceleration of a registration 
statement.111  Moreover, unlike the harsh language imposed on 
 
109 Regulation S-K, item 510, 17 C.F.R. §229.510 (requiring that this statement be 
included in the registration statements of registrants not requesting acceleration of 
effectiveness).  For registrants requesting acceleration of the effective date, the 
same statement is required as well as the following additional language: 
In the event that a claim for indemnification against such liabilities (other than 
the payment by the registrant of expenses incurred or paid by a director, officer 
or controlling person of the registrant in the successful defense of any action, suit 
or proceeding) is asserted by such director, officer or controlling person in 
connection with the securities being registered, the registrant will, unless in the 
opinion of its counsel the matter has been settled by controlling precedent, 
submit to a court of appropriate jurisdiction the question whether such 
indemnification by it is against public policy as expressed in the Act and will be 
governed by the final adjudication of such issue. 
Regulation S-K, item 512(h), 17 C.F.R. §229.512(h).  These line-item disclosures 
are triggered in each of the major forms governing the registration of securities.  
See, e.g., Forms S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, S-8 and S-11. 
110 See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATIONS, 3d § 2.C.2. 
(2004) (stating basis of avoiding frustration of the in terrorem effect of the 
Securities Act).  See also Globus v. Law Res. Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288-89 
(2d Cir. 1969), (concurring with SEC position and denying indemnification on the 
view that liability “was designed not so much to compensate the defrauded 
purchaser as to ... deter negligence”) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).  Similarly, 
public policy has been held to prevent indemnification under other federal statutes.  
See, e.g., Sequa Corp. v. Gelmin, 851 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y., 1993) 
(indemnification for RICO liability against public policy). 
111 17 C.F.R. 230.461(c) ( “Insurance against liabilities arising under the Act, 
whether the cost of insurance is borne by the registrant, the insured or some other 
person, will not be considered a bar to acceleration….”).  The Commission does, 
however, consider registered investment companies a special case, requiring greater 
scrutiny of insurance arrangements.  Id.; see also Investment Companies and 
Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §  80a-17(h) (prohibiting “any provision which protects ... 
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registrants adopting indemnification provisions, the SEC requires 
only that the existence and “general effect” of D&O insurance 
policies be disclosed.112  Considering that insurance and 
indemnification raise the same policy concerns,113 the maintenance of 
distinct positions seems inconsistent, and in any event, has never been 
explained by the SEC.114 
 The regulation that requires registrants to disclose the existence 
of D&O insurance does not require the disclosure of any policy 
details.  Item 702 of Regulation S-K requires that registrants: 
[s]tate the general effect of any statute, charter provisions, 
by-laws, contract or other arrangements under which any 
controlling persons, director or officer of the registrant is 
insured or indemnified in any manner against liability which 
he may incur in his capacity as such.115 
 
Although the “general effect” of D&O insurance may be read to 
require some discussion of policy details, registrants generally 
provide nothing more than an opaque statement that coverage will be 
 
any director or officers of [a registered investment company] against ... willful 
misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard of ... duties”). 
112 See Regulation S-K, item 702, 17 CFR §229.702.  This disclosure is triggered, 
like the disclosures required by items 510 and 512(h), by each of the major forms 
governing the registration of securities.  See, e.g., Forms S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, S-8 and 
S-11. 
113 Interestingly, the Commission originally treated insurance and indemnification 
together in item 510 of Regulation S-K, requiring disclosure of insurance 
arrangements in sub-section of the provision mandating inclusion of the policy 
statement on indemnification.  See SEC Release 33-6383, 1982 WL 90370, at *14, 
*19, *100-101, and *115 (splitting what was then S-K 510(a) and (b) into what is 
now S-K 510 and 702, respectively).  
114 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 110, at § 2.C.2., n.83 (“The Commission 
policy on indemnification is hardly a jewel of consistency. It applies solely to 
indemnification by registrants and not to indemnification by insurers or by other 
third parties.”); Milton P. Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions 
and S.E.C. Liability Insurance In Light of BarChris and Globus, 24 BUS. LAW. 681, 
687-92 (1969) (reviewing SEC policies on indemnification and insurance).  The 
inconsistencies in the SEC’s position are several.  On its face, it applies only to 
violations of the Securities Act, not the Securities Exchange Act, and therefore 
captures disclosure violations in connection with securities issuance but not to 
securities fraud under section 10b-5, a distinction for which the basis is unclear.  
Furthermore, the bar on indemnification of securities law liabilities has been 
interpreted by courts not to apply to defense costs or settlement.  See, e.g., Raychem 
Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that 
indemnification of settlement is not against public policy); Goldstein v Alodex 
Corp., 409 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (ruling that indemnification of defense 
costs is not against public policy).  Since most securities claims are settled, these 
exceptions seem to swallow the rule. 
115 17 CFR §229.702. 
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available, subject to unstated limits, to cover certain liabilities arising 
from the directors’ or officers’ conduct as such.116  By granting 
effectiveness to these registration statements, the SEC effectively 
accepts such non-descriptive language in fulfillment of the required 
disclosure. 
 The SEC could require much more detail.  The SEC could, for 
example, treat D&O insurance as a “material contract” and require 
that policies be filed as an exhibit to the registration statement.117  It 
could also treat D&O insurance as an aspect of executive 
compensation, triggering a fulsome description of policy features 
including the cost and value of the policy, as it does in the case of life 
insurance. 118  However, the SEC has made neither of these choices, 
instead treating D&O insurance as a matter distinct from executive 
compensation and thereby minimizing the required disclosure of 
policy details.119 
 It is puzzling, given both the SEC’s strident position on 
indemnification and the valuable information that D&O policy details 
may convey, why the SEC does not require disclosure of registrants’ 
D&O policy premiums, limits, and retentions.  This may seem 
especially strange considering the fact, explored in the next section, 
 
116 For example, in its registration statement, Yankee Candle made the following 
statement: 
Policies of insurance are maintained by Yankee Candle under which its directors 
and officers are insured, within the limits and subject to the limitations of the 
policies, against certain expenses in connection with the defense of, and certain 
liabilities which might be imposed as a result of, actions, suits or proceedings to 
which they are parties by reason of being or having been such directors or 
officers. 
Amended Registration Statement on Form S-3 of Yankee Candle Co., Inc., (Apr. 
22, 2002) at II-1. 
117 See Regulation S-K item 601(b)(10), 17 C.F.R. §229.601 (requiring that certain 
“Material Contracts” be filed as exhibits to the registrants public filings). 
118 See, e.g., Regulation S-K item 402(b)(2)(iv)(E), 17 C.F.R. §402 (requiring 
disclosure of dollar value of life insurance provided by the corporation to its 
executives and the premiums paid by the corporation). 
119 The SEC has expressly stated that it will not treat D&O insurance as a form of 
executive compensation. 
Premiums paid for liability insurance for officers and directors and benefits paid 
under such insurance plans are not forms of remuneration to the extent that the 
insurance plan is intended to relieve officers and directors of liability relating to 
their job performance. 
1978 SEC LEXIS 2277 (1978) (release regarding “Disclosure of Management 
Remuneration”).  In taking this position, the SEC essentially follows the IRS, which 
also does not treat D&O insurance as executive compensation.  See KNEPPER & 
BAILEY, supra note 18, at §22.22. 
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that Canadian securities regulators require disclosure of precisely 
these items. 
 
B. A Canadian Comparison 
 Unlike their counterparts in the United States, Canadian securities 
regulators do require disclosure of D&O insurance details.  Public 
companies in Canada must disclose basic information concerning 
their D&O insurance policies, including coverage limits and 
premiums, in their proxy filings and registration statements.120  This 
provides the opportunity to conduct a natural experiment.  Can the 
information disclosed in these Canadian filings be used to establish a 
link between corporate governance and D&O insurance?  A handful 
of economists have tested this data, but legal differences between the 
two countries make it difficult to import conclusions from Canada or 
any foreign jurisdiction to American corporate governance.121 
Professor Core has preformed the leading study examining 
Canadian data to determine whether D&O premiums can be related to 
corporate governance variables.122  Hypothesizing that D&O 
premiums would be a function both of business-specific risk factors 
and governance-related risk factors, Core separated proxy variables 
relating to each.123  Grouping measures of ownership structure, board 
 
120 See Ontario Securities Commission, Form 30.  This information is publicly 
available on the Ontario Securities Commission’s online database of public filings.  
See System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (“SEDAR”), available 
online at http://www.sedar.com.  Canadian corporations are given express 
permission to purchase D&O insurance under the Canadian Business Corporations 
Act.  R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 124(6) (2004) (“A corporation may purchase and maintain 
insurance for the benefit of an[officer or director] against any liability incurred by 
the individual … in the individual’s capacity as a director or officer of the 
corporation…”). 
121 Although the legal systems of the U.S. and Canada are broadly similar, Canada is 
a considerably less favorable environment for entrepreneurial plaintiffs lawyers.  
Canada retains the English “loser pays” system, increasing the risk borne by the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.  As a result, contingent fees are used less often and, when they 
are used, are subject to a reasonableness standard.  Class actions and derivative suits 
are filed less often, perhaps because punitive damages are rarely awarded.  See, e.g., 
Ronald J. Daniels & Susan M. Hutton, The Capricious Cushion: The Implications of 
the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Crisis on Canadian Corporate 
Governance, 22 CANADIAN BUS. LAW J. 182 (1993). 
122 See John E. Core, The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Premium: An Outside 
Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 449 
(2000). 
123 Id., at 454 (“a firm’s D&O premium is hypothesized to be a function of both the 
quality of its corporate governance and its business risk”). 
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size, and management entrenchment together as indicators of 
“governance quality” and firm size, financial performance, and U.S. 
exchange listing as proxies for “business risk,”124 Core regressed each 
variable against D&O premiums, finding approximately half of the 
governance quality variables to be statistically significant, while each 
of the business risk variables was statistically significant.125  
Significant governance quality variables—including insider stock 
ownership and voting control, director independence, and executive 
employment contracts126—enabled Core ultimately to conclude that 
Canadian data supports an association between D&O premiums and 
governance quality.127 
 One of the variables Core found to be most significant, however, 
underscores the study’s inherent limitations.  If a Canadian firm is 
also listed on a U.S. exchange, exposing it to U.S. securities litigation, 
the firm has significantly higher D&O premiums.  This emphasizes 
the difference between U.S. and Canadian liability risks.  At least 
with regard to shareholder litigation, and perhaps representative 
litigation generally, the legal systems between the two countries are 
different enough to make cross-country comparisons somewhat 
tenuous.  Thus, although Core’s study supports the link between 
corporate governance and D&O insurance predicted by this Essay, 
without U.S. data it cannot support a firm conclusion.   
In a recent working paper, Professor Kaltchev attempts to 
develop his own U.S. data set from proprietary and confidential 
information supplied by two insurance brokerage firms.128  Kaltchev’s 
data set includes information on insurance limits and retentions—that 
is, data on the amount of D&O insurance purchased—for almost 300 
 
124 Id., at 457-462. 
125 These proxies included management experience (the longer the manager has 
been on the board, the lower the firm’s litigation risk), financial performance (the 
worse the firm’s return on equity, the worse its litigation risk), size (greater total 
assets, greater risk), prior litigation (firms with a history of litigation are worse 
litigation risks), and U.S. operations or U.S. listing (both of which increased 
litigation risk). 
126Id., at 463-466.  Core notes that all governance variables have the predicted sign 
and that they add explanatory power to the model as a group, even if only four of 
nine are individually significant. Id., at 468. 
127 See id., at 451 (“The results indicate that D&O premiums are significantly higher 
when inside control of share votes is greater, when inside ownership is lower, when 
the board is comprised of fewer outside directors, when the CEO has appointed 
more of the outside directors, and when insider officers have employment 
contracts.”) 
128 George D. Kaltchev, The Demand For Directors’ and Officers’ Liability 
Insurance By US Companies, 34 (July 2004) (describing the unique data set 
consisting of approximately 300 U.S. companies spanning the period 1997-2003). 
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companies, which he has used to test hypotheses for why companies 
purchase D&O insurance.129  Perhaps unsurprisingly, Kaltchev finds 
the best predictor of D&O limits is the insured company’s market 
capitalization.130  After size, the leading indicators of insurance 
amounts seem to be returns, with larger returns on assets tending to 
produce lower insurance limits.131  This could be taken to suggest that 
better managers are less likely to insist on high levels of D&O 
insurance or, relatedly, that companies that perform better are less 
likely to be sued.  Alternately, an inverse relationship between returns 
and coverage limits may simply indicate that firms with high cash 
flows can more easily self-insure against litigation risk.  Kaltchev’s 
findings also support a significant relationship between indicators of 
financial health, as indicated by leverage and volatility, and D&O 
coverage limits: the higher a company’s leverage and volatility, the 
more insurance it buys.  Of the corporate governance variables tested, 
it is worth noting that companies that have not split the chief 
executive and chairperson of the board functions tend to buy more 
D&O insurance and that director and officer ownership of firm stock 
correlates to lower policy limits.132 
A significant weakness of the Kaltchev study, however, is that it 
lacks information on insurance pricing.  Because almost every firm 
purchases D&O insurance and because losses correlate to size, 
insurance pricing is more likely to be sensitive to governance 
variables than coverage limits or overall demand.  Kaltchev was 
unable to produce this data from his confidential U.S. sources while 
Core, in spite of access to pricing information through Canadian 
firms’ proxy statements, was subject to limitations in making 
comparisons across legal systems that, at least on the issue of 
shareholder litigation, are significantly different.  Thus, the only way 
to provide researchers and market participants with the information 
embedded in the D&O insurance premium may be to mandate 
disclosure of such data in U.S. securities law.  This is the solution 
proposed in the next section. 
 
129 Id. 
130 Id., at 52 (noting that “[the market value of firm equity] appears to be directly 
related to limits, as a measure of the potential size of loss”).    This is as one would 
expect since the larger the market capitalization, the greater the potential damages 
in shareholder litigation. 
131 Id. 
132 Id., at 36 (arguing that this confirms “the hypothesis that higher managerial 
ownership aligns the interests of shareholders and managers and that insurance and 
ownership are … substitutes”).  But see Core, supra note 122, at tbl. 2 (finding, in 
Canadian data set, that separation between chief executive and chairperson roles 
does not seem to affect premiums). 
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C.  The SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of D&O Insurance Details 
 The law should be changed to require disclosure of greater detail 
concerning a company’s D&O policies.  In addition to disclosing the 
existence of a policy, companies should be required to disclose the 
identity of the insurer, the limits and retention under each side type of 
coverage (Side A, B, and C), and perhaps most importantly, the D&O 
premium.  These disclosures should be required on an annual basis.  
Each of these additional disclosures could provide valuable 
information that is currently unavailable to capital market 
participants. 
This Essay has argued that a firm’s D&O insurance premium is 
related to its governance quality and should therefore convey an 
important signal concerning the value of the firm’s corporate 
governance.  Requiring disclosure of the firm’s D&O insurance 
premium on an annual basis would thus provide investors with 
valuable information, alerting them to changes in the governance risk 
of the firm.  If, for example, a firm’s D&O insurance significantly 
increased in a year in which similarly situated firms in the same 
industry experience no change in their premiums, investors would be 
put on notice that something significant had changed at the firm.  
Moreover, because the governance assessment implicit on the 
insurance premium is based on private information provided to the 
D&O insurer—information that the insurer, unlike equity analysts 
operating under Regulation FD, is under no obligation to share with 
other market participants—the signal offered by a change in insurance 
premiums may alert investors to a piece of information that, because 
it is not public, is otherwise unavailable to them.133 
Details on the amount of D&O insurance purchased—that is, the 
company’s policy limits and retentions—would provide several vital 
pieces of information.  First, without information on the amount of 
insurance purchased, data on premiums would be too noisy to be 
meaningful.  Information on limits and retentions is necessary to 
specify precisely what the company is paying for and to enable 
comparisons across different firms buying similar amounts of 
coverage.  Moreover, requiring information about the amount of 
coverage under each type of coverage—that is, Side A, B, and C—
would provide additional signals to the market.  As described above, 
Side A coverage is the only form of coverage that benefits officers 
and directors individually.  The amount of Side A coverage purchased 
by a firm could thus convey an important signal about the confidence 
 
133 17 C.F.R. 243 (2001) (preventing selective disclosure of material nonpublic 
information). 
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of its managers regarding the liability risks they expect to face.  
Sanguine managers may require their firms to purchase less coverage.  
As a result, other things being equal, a firm purchasing lower amounts 
of Side A insurance may tend to pose less risk of shareholder 
litigation.  Unlike Side A coverage, Side B and Side C coverages 
benefit the company only and, as described above, may be rooted in 
managerial agency costs.  As a result, a company purchasing large 
amounts of coverage under Sides B and C sends a signal not only that 
its managers believe the firm presents a relatively large risk of 
shareholder litigation but also that it has the kind of managers who 
would rather waste corporate assets in a negative net present value 
investment than put their personal compensation packages at risk by 
allowing the firm to self-insure against shareholder litigation. 
 Finally, the identity of the D&O insurer would provide valuable 
information about the reputation of the gatekeeper.  Investors may 
draw different conclusions if, for example, a company’s primary 
D&O insurer is a market leader in D&O insurance versus an 
unknown, cut-rate insurer.  The cut-rate insurer may have an incentive 
to lower premiums irrespective of governance risk in order to capture 
greater market share.  Although this will be a losing strategy in the 
long run, upstart firms may try it in the short run to establish a set of 
clients, hoping to make up the increased risk with higher premiums in 
the future.  More directly, some insurers may develop a reputation for 
developing better risk pools than others with the result that the 
companies they underwrite will be viewed by investors as better 
governance risks.  
Given the potential value of this new information to market 
participants, the SEC should change the relevant regulations to cause 
corporations to provide it.  This would be a technically simple matter.  
The Commission could amend Regulation S-K item 702 to mandate, 
instead of a weak statement of the “general effect” of insurance 
arrangements, explicit disclosure of the registrant’s D&O premium, 
its limits and retentions under each type of coverage, and the identity 
of the registrant’s primary D&O insurance carrier.  Then, in order to 
make this disclosure annual, the Commission could add a cross 
reference in Form 10-K to item 702, thereby requiring registrants to 
disclose detailed information on D&O insurance when they file their 
annual reports. 
Although such modifications would be technically simple, the 
Commission may encounter political resistance to this change, both 
from registrants and insurers.  Their most likely argument is that 
mandating disclosure of D&O insurance details will encourage the 
filing of non-meritorious lawsuits by plaintiffs’ lawyers eager to reach 
insurance assets.  It is unlikely, however, that plaintiffs’ lawyers will 
learn much from these additional disclosures that they did not already 
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know or suspect.  After all, it is no secret that over 95% of U.S. 
companies carry D&O insurance and that average limits for 
companies with assets in excess of $100 million are in the tens of 
millions of dollars.134  Plaintiffs’ lawyers know this and, because they 
make a living out of it, can be expected to estimate a company’s 
likely coverage within a fairly accurate range.  Moreover, once a 
claim arises, plaintiffs’ lawyers can be expected to hone their estimate 
of a defendant company’s D&O coverage to such a degree that 
requiring disclosure of this information on an annual basis is unlikely 
to alter the dynamics of either filing or settlement. 
There may, however, be some subtext to this and other objections 
of both registrants and the insurance industry.  Registrants may resist 
the disclosure of D&O insurance data because, as described above, it 
threatens to reveal new information about the level of agency costs at 
the firm.  Yet this is precisely why the SEC should require it.  
Moreover, not every company will suffer from these disclosures.  
There are likely to be companies, for example, that pay relatively little 
in D&O premiums or that purchase only Side A coverage, both of 
which signal good governance and low agency costs.  Unmasking this 
information would provide positive information about these firms 
and, potentially, result in a positive adjustment in their share value.  In 
addition, disclosure of the amount that all registrants pay for D&O 
coverage may make the market for D&O insurance more competitive.  
If, when renewing its policy, a company is able to cite the lower 
premiums paid by several of its competitors, the company may be in a 
position to bargain for a lower premium itself.  This improved 
transparency would thus benefit all companies in that market.135 
Making the market for D&O coverage more competitive may be 
precisely what the insurance industry is afraid of.  Insurance industry 
objections to mandatory disclosure of D&O policy details may thus 
be rooted in the view that additional disclosure will drive down rates 
and make it even more difficult for insurers to make a profit from 
their professional liability lines.  But this again is a strange objection 
since it is rooted in inefficiencies and market power.  From a public 
policy perspective, these are problems to be solved, not rights to be 
protected, and mandating disclosure of D&O premiums may be a step 
in the direction of solving them. 
 
134 Tillinghast 2003 Directors and Officers Liability Survey, supra note 35, at fig. 3 
and 5. 
135 It would not benefit insurance brokers, however, who as intermediaries in these 
transactions purport to add value through their special knowledge and expertise of 
the marketplace.  If this information was made publicly available, the need for 
intermediaries would be reduced.  Although the brokers may object, it is not clear 
that this is not in fact another benefit of disclosure. 
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 The likely objections to mandatory disclosure of D&O insurance 
details from registrants and insurance companies are, at any rate, not 
highly principled.  The basic benefit of this disclosure is improvement 
of capital market efficiency through the signaling effects provided by 
D&O policy details.  A possible side-benefit of mandatory disclosure 
of this information is the improvement of product market efficiency 
for this type of insurance.  The Commission thus has strong 
arguments at its disposal to answer the narrow, self-interested 
objections of registrants and the insurance industry.  Moreover, the 
modification to the existing regime of securities regulation would be 
technically simple to accomplish.  Because the benefits thus appear to 
overwhelm the costs, the SEC should change the law to mandate the 
disclosure of D&O policy details in annual filings. 
 
VI.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 This Essay has explored the connection between corporate 
governance and D&O insurance.  From the fact that D&O insurers act 
as gatekeepers and guarantors, screening and pricing corporate 
governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools, this 
Essay has advanced the hypothesis that, other things being equal, 
firms with relatively worse corporate governance pay higher D&O 
premiums.  This hypothesis thus implies that a company’s D&O 
insurance premium would signal important information concerning a 
firm’s governance quality to investors and other capital market 
participants.  Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent.  Corporations 
lack the incentive to produce this disclosure themselves, and the SEC 
currently does not require registrants to provide this information.  As 
a result, this Essay has advocated a change to U.S. securities 
regulation, making disclosure of D&O policy details—specifically 
premiums, limits and retentions under each type of insurance, as well 
as the identity of the insurer—mandatory.  Because such disclosure 
would improve the “total mix” of information in the capital markets, 
would cost very little to implement, and does not give rise to a 
principled objection, this Essay urges the Commission to adopt this 
proposed reform as soon as possible. 
 
